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Abstract A template attack, the most powerful side-channel attack methods, usually first builds the leakage
profiles from a controlled profiling device, and then uses these profiles to recover the secret of the target device.
It is based on the fact that the profiling device shares similar leakage characteristics with the target device.
In this study, we focus on the similar operations in a single device and propose a new variant of the template
attack, called the similar operation template attack (SOTA). SOTA builds the models on public variables (e.g.,
input/output) and recovers the values of the secret variables that leak similar to the public variables. SOTAs
advantage is that it can avoid the requirement of an additional profiling device. In this study, the proposed
SOTA method is applied to a straightforward RSA-CRT implementation. Because the leakage is (almost) the
same in similar operations, we reduce the security of RSA-CRT to a hidden multiplier problem (HMP) over
GF (q), which can be solved byte-wise using our proposed heuristic algorithm. The effectiveness of our proposed
method is verified as an entire prime recovery procedure in a practical leakage scenario.
Keywords Side channel attack, Template attack, RSA-CRT, Hidden number problem, Prime recovery
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1 Introduction
In the field of side-channel attacks (SCAs), the seminal differential power analysis (DPA) method was
proposed by Kocher et al. [2]. Then, researchers proposed many SCA methods, leading to a central
division between non-profiled and profiled attacks. The former attack methods are based on a comparison
of actual leakages and a prior leakage model. Examples include correlation power analysis (CPA) [14],
mutual information analysis (MIA) [24], and differential clustering analysis (DCA) [15] methods. In the
profiled analysis methods, a leakage model is built from the profiling devices that are under adversaries’
control, which implicitly relies on the fact that the leakage characteristics of the profiling and target
devices are similar. Generally, the origin of the leakage similarity (of profiling and under test devices) is
in the similar hardware behaviors or structures. The Gaussian template attack (TA) [29], which operates
by estimating the Gaussian probability density function of the side channel leakages, is the representative
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attack method. Although it is not yet a perfect model for estimation, the TA can still be viewed as the
most powerful type of SCA.
A large variety of public key cryptosystems (PKC) are employed to protect the security of sensitive
assets. Typically, a PKC scheme is based on hard mathematical problems, such as a large number
factorization problem or discrete logarithm problem, which hereafter are referred to as primitives. In
general, a specific PKC scheme implementation includes (informally) two parts: a primitive and a com-
bination phase. The former part usually contains modular exponentiation or scalar multiplication, e.g.,
RSA or elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). The latter part obtains the final results (encryption, de-
cryption, digital signature, or key exchange) based on the former parts results. The combination of the
two parts varies according to different schemes. Both parts can be threatened by SCAs. The attack
methods can extract the secret cryptographic key or intermediate values, including power consumption,
electromagnetic emissions, timing, or faults collected from a running cryptographic device, by using s-
tatistical tools operating on side channel leakages. Many studies have provided practical attack results
on embedded devices [34–36]. Recently, papers have been published that describe attack procedures on
specific PKC schemes implemented on PCs [31–33] and mobile phones [23]. In the last paper, the SCA
and lattice attack were combined to reveal the secret key of elliptic curve digital signature algorithm
(ECDSA) implementation in the most recent OpenSSL. The attack technique can also be employed to
analyze the security of RSA given a known partial secret prime. A typical technique is Coppersmith’s
method [12]. The method breaks RSA using half the most significant bytes of a secret prime by applying
a lattice attack. Therefore, half the most significant bytes of a prime are fatal in the case of an RSA
implementation.
Researchers are dedicated to constructing secure primitive implementations to mitigate SCAs. The
first step is to counteract simple power analysis (SPA), which can obtain the secret parameters involved
in primitives through different computational patterns, such as modular multiplication and modular
squaring in a modular exponentiation or point addition and point doubling in scalar multiplication.
Typical SPA-resistant methods are the Montgomery powering ladder [5], atomic implementation [7],
and dummy operations [6]. The second step is to thwart DPA. This type of countermeasure includes
exponentiation blinding (splitting) and message blinding. In general, SCA-secure primitives, such as
those presented in [17], usually combine both types of countermeasures. Attention has seldom been paid
to the combination phase of a PKC scheme, even when a CPA attack can be mounted [34, 37]. In [16],
the authors provided an SPA attack on modular inversion implemented with an extended Euclidean
algorithm, which is further evidence that a secure primitive does not ensure a secure implementation.
The requirement of an identical profiling device is a strong assumption in a practical TA. In this
study, we focus on the similarity between two similar operations in the PKC scheme, especially in the
combination phase. We propose the similar operation TA (SOTA, subtraction in [13]) in the combination
phase of RSA-CRT implementation. In our attack scenario, we can mitigate the requirement of an
additional profiling device by construing templates on the public information, based on which we find a
new means of analyzing the security of the RSA-CRT.
Contributions. Our work is based on the intuition that similar operations share similar leakage, which
is confirmed by our experimental results. First, we present a general attack method named SOTA
to exploit the similar leakage of similar operations through side channel leakage. We stress that the
effectiveness of SOTA relies on the preprocessing procedure employed and the TA methods.
Second, we observe that there still may exist a difference in the similar operations’ side channel leakage
characteristics with the same leakage model. This difference negatively affects the SOTA results when
the adversary utilizes raw power traces. A preprocessing procedure named zero-mean [28] is employed to
unify raw leakage to achieve better performance. SOTA is effective because the templates are built on
public information and do not require an additional profiling device. Our results show that the zero-mean
method is suitable for situations involving both cross-device and similar operations.
Finally, we find that the SCA against RSA-CRT can be reduced to solving a hidden multiplier problem
(HMP) over GF (q). We propose a heuristic algorithm that, after SOTA recovers secret intermediate data,
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solves the problem by recovering hidden primes byte-by-byte. We applied the proposed attack procedure
to an RSA-CRT software implementation in a practical Hamming weight leakage scenario where both
the SOTA and the prime recover algorithm are effective. In our experiments, we also considered error
matching of secret intermediate data bytes, which means that in the SOTA these bytes’ Hamming weight
may randomly be categorized into adjacent values with a certain probability. We can recover the hidden
prime through 100 inputs with only the Hamming weight even when 50% of the inputs contain noise.
Our work provides a new technique for RSA-CRT security analysis, which is based on the idea of
using similar operations instead of constructing a profile using an additional identical device. We can
reveal partial information about secret intermediate data by focusing on the data transferal instead of the
primitive implementation. Then, a hidden prime can be revealed by solving the HMP. To the best of our
knowledge, no previous studies have been published that used a similar attack procedure. Therefore, this
study makes a novel contribution to the academic literature. Our experiment shows that the efficiency
of our attack is similar to that of existing methods, because SOTA exploits leakage characteristics that
are similar to those used in these methods. The final hidden prime recovery requires no additional power
traces, and its execution time is practical.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Template attack
TA is one of the most powerful SCA attack methods. Researchers are dedicated to improving it by
introducing new technologies [20,21,26,27]. Cross-device TAs can also be practical [18,28]. This type of
TA employs a transformation to maximize the similarity between a profiling device and a target device.
Both traditional TA and clustering-based TA [25] remains a matter of concern . They involve two steps:
profiling and matching. Let L be the side channel leakage matrix and lt,nm,d be the n-th vector during a
time interval t, where m is input plaintext and d is the actual secret key. Typically, ltinte denotes one
leakage vector in t under an intermediate value inte. The traditional TA procedure is as follows.
Profiling. In this phase, an adversary needs to control a profiling device that is identical (or very
similar) to the target device. Suppose that an adversary obtains |s| leakage vectors for a given class
s ∈ S. The classification is related to an intermediate value v = f(m, d), where the function f is
reversible. The intermediate values can be reflected by power traces. A multivariate Gaussian noise
model is in general considered to describe the leakage characteristics:
N (lt,1m,d|µs,Σs) =
1
(2pi)N/2
exp{−1
2
(lt,1m,d − µs)TΣ−1s (lt,1m,d − µs)}. (1)
where µs is the mean vector and Σs is the covariance matrix. In the profiling stage, the parameters of
each class are estimated. Both parameters reveal completely the noise distribution associated with each
class in S. In a practical situation, an adversary usually utilizes the empirical mean and covariance:
µˆs =
1
|si|
|si|∑
n=1
lt,nm,d, (2)
Σˆs =
1
|si|
|si|∑
n=1
(lt,nm,d − µˆs)(lt,nm,d − µˆs)T . (3)
Matching. Given an unclassified power trace lt,1new, we employ Bayes’ rule to determine to which class
it belongs. The classification rule is
sˆ = argmaxs∗ Pˆ r[s
∗|lt,1new] = argmaxs∗ Pˆ r[lt,1new|s∗]Pr[s∗]. (4)
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where Pr[s∗] is the prior probability of the class candidate s∗. If the classification is based on the
byte value, the prior probability is Pr[s∗] = 1256 . In general, we have Pr[s
∗] = 1|S| and Pˆ r[s
∗|lt,1new] =
N (ltx,d|µs∗ ,Σs∗). The maximum probability indicates the correct classification, which means the inter-
mediate value v∗ is obtained. Then, we obtain d∗ = f−1(x, v∗). The leakage matrix lt,mnew can also be
utilized to assign power traces to the candidate s∗ with a higher probability than one power trace. The
classification rule is slightly modified:
sˆ = argmaxs∗
N∑
i=1
Pˆ r[lt,inew|s∗]Pr[s∗]. (5)
Adversaries utilize TA attacks to obtain secret intermediate data in the same time interval t. The
traditional TA is effective under a known or an identical leakage model. However, estimation errors exist
between the practical leakage and the estimated leakage model. To avoid these errors, cluster-based TA
can be employed. In [25], the authors showed how to utilize K-means and agglomerative hierarchical
clustering to build a template without prior knowledge of the leakage model. These cluster techniques
help obtain a template that is close to the practical leakage situation. In this study, we constructed
templates in the practical leakage scenario.
2.2 RSA-CRT implementation
In 1978, the RSA cryptosystem, which has become one of the most widely used public key cryptosystems,
was introduced by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman [9]. RSA is based on a large number factorization
problems and can be utilized for encryption and signature schemes. In an RSA scheme, N denotes the
public modulus, being the product of two secret large prime integers p and q. d denotes the secret private
key and e is the public key satisfying de = 1 mod φ(N), where φ denotes Euler’s totient function and
φ(N) = (p−1)× (q−1) is also secret. The RSA signature or decryption of a message m ∈ ZN is achieved
by computing the modular exponentiation C = Md mod N . To verify or encrypt C, M = Ce mod N is
computed.
Algorithm 1 RSA-CRT implementation
Require: secret key d, secret primes p and q message M
Ensure: C = Md mod N
1: dp = d mod p, dq = d mod q
2: K = p−1 mod q
3: Mp = M mod p,Mq = M mod q
4: Cp = M
dp
p mod p
5: Cq = M
dq
q mod q
6: C = (((Cq − Cp) ×K) mod q) × p + Cp
7: Return C
As is well known, modular exponentiation is time consuming. Researchers have utilized the Chinese
remainder theorem (CRT) [10] to accelerate the core computation with a factor of four, and this is widely
used in devices having limited resources. The RSA-CRT is described in Algorithm 1. Step 6 can also be
rewritten as
C = x× p+ Cp. (6)
x = ((Cq − Cp) ×K) mod q, p, and Cp are secret for adversaries. However, half the most significant
bytes of C and the secret x × p are identical, because Cp receives the same bit length as p. According
to SCA theory, side channel leakage reflects all the intermediate data. The remaining question is how to
extract this information, which is one of our main concerns in this paper.
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3 Methodology
3.1 Similar operation template attack strategy
In this paper, operations that share similar basic hardware behaviors are referred to as similar operations.
Their leakage functions may resemble each other. Opi and Osi denote two similar operations manipulated
on public and secret information, respectively. The SOTA strategy, in its most general form, is as follows.
1. Acquire power traces on a running cryptographic device, where side channel leakage is L = lt1si‖lt2pi
and ‖ is concatenation. lt1si and lt2pi are the side channel leakage of Osi and Opi, respectively.
2. Select the template building method according to the practical leakage scenario. Construct template
T on the side channel leakage of Opi. Utilize the corresponding matching method D(l
t1
si , T ) to reveal
si.
3. Verify attack results.
SOTA attempts to reveal secret parameters through templates built on public information through
side channel leakage. In Step 1, we divide the power traces into several parts. lt2pi denotes the leakage of
public information, which can easily be detected by Pearson’s correlation. This part includes the RSA
final output, C. The public information can also be found in other PKC schemes, such as the signature
output in ECDSA. lt1si contains secret information involving all the intermediate values in the combination
phase of RSA-CRT.
Step 2 constitutes the complete template attack procedure. We build templates on leakage lt2pi and then
reveal the secret si by using these templates. In the same power trace collection, the measurements can
be utilized for both template profiling and matching. It is worth mentioning that t1 == t2 is required in
a traditional TA, whereas t1 6= t2 is evaluated in our attack procedure. In addition to traditional TAs,
subspace-based TAs, clustering-based TAs [25], principle component analysis [21,22], and Fisher’s linear
discriminant analysis [20] can also be employed in the SOTA procedure.
In Step 3, verification is performed. In a PKC scheme, our attack results may not be the secret key but
rather the secret intermediate values, which are dependent on the attack target. Then, the verification
step, which attempts to recover the private key or a hidden prime in the RSA scheme, is necessary. Let us
take RSA-CRT as an example. If the secret result x× p is obtained, the factorization of N is successfully
achieved by computing gcd(x × p,N). If partial information about x is obtained, then we must find a
new means of recovering the hidden prime, because no previous method provides a solution. Even half
the most significant bytes of one prime pˆ are sufficient, since Coppersmith’s method can be executed to
reveal the secret key.
In general, the SOTA attack procedure can be viewed as a comparison of two independent leakages.
The attack method proposed in [13] can be viewed as a variant of similar operations that reveal a secret
key by comparing two modular multiplications having one identical input. In our attack procedure, we
attempt to exploit the simpler operations in the RSA-CRT combination phase by applying a combination
TA.
3.2 SOTA in RSA-CRT combination phase
In this study, we attempted to find two similar operations in the combination phase of RSA-CRT. In
Figure 1, the typical RSA-CRT implementation is shown. Message is the input plaintext. In the RSA-
CRT naive implementation, the first step is the precomputation, as shown in Algorithm 1 (line 1-3). All
the corresponding results are stored and transferred to two modular exponentiations, which constitute
the core computation of an RSA-CRT scheme. After the computation of both modular exponentiations,
the final results (C in Algorithm 1) are obtained through the combination.
However, our concern is the combination phase (line 6 in Algorithm 1), which is shown in the lower part
of Figure 1, where the four computation blocks are shown: modular subtraction, modular multiplication,
multiplication, and addition. The modular subtraction is A = (Cq−Cp)mod q, the modular multiplication
Sen Xu DO NOT DISTRIBUTE, et al. Sci China Inf Sci 6
Modular Exponentiation 1
Message
Final 
Results
Target Implementation
 Data flow 
Modular 
Substraction
Modular 
Multiplication
Multiplication
Secret Data 
Transferring
Secret Data 
Transferring
op1 op3op2
Side Channel Leakage
Side Channel Leakage
Combination Phase
Precomputation
Modular Exponentiation 2
Combination
Modular 
Addition
Secret Data 
Transferring
Final Results 
Transferring
op4
Side Channel Leakage
Side Channel Leakage
 Data transferring 
1nx - 2nx - 3nx - 1ix +
2 1nr - 2 2nr - 2 3nr - 2 4nr - 2 5nr -
1 1n nx p- -´
2n ir - 1kr + 1kr - 2kr -
2 1n nx p- -´
3 1n nx p- -´
1i nx p -´
1 2n nx p- -´
2 2n nx p- -´
3 2n nx p- -´
2i nx p -´
hb lb
hb lb
hb lb
hb lb
hb lb
hb lb
hb lb
hb lb
1 3n nx p- -´hb lb
i jx p´hb lb 0 0x p´hb lb
1 0
x p´hb lb
2 0
x p´hb lb
0ix p´
0 1
x p´hb lb
1 1
x p´hb lb
2 1
x p´hb lb
5
r
4
r
3
r
2
r
1
r
0
r
0 2
x p´hb lb
1 2
x p´hb lb
2ix p´hb lb
hb lb
ix 1ix - 1x 0x
1np - 2np - 3np - 1ip + ip 1ip - 1p 0p´
kr
Figure 1 Similar operations in the RSA-CRT com-
bination phase.
Figure 2 Byte-wise multiplication from the most signifi-
cant byte.
is B = A ×K mod q, the multiplication is D = B × p, and the addition is C = D + Cp. C is the final
result of Md mod N . In a resource-limited device, the four blocks are executed serially. The results of
the previous block must be transferred into the next one, which means that data transferal occurs after
each computation block. We focus on the data transferal in the combination procedure, shown by arrows
in the lower part of Figure 1.
We refer to op1, op2, op3, and op4 as the similar operations in the combination step (lower part of
Figure 1). This type of similar operations shares a simpler structure than that used in [13]. The transferal
is independent of the specific computation block, but the byte flow is loaded from the previous block to
the next one. op1, op2, and op3 denote the secret intermediate data transferal. op4 denotes the final result
transferal, which is public information. The basic hardware structure of similar operations is identical,
which means that the side channel leakage patterns are similar.
The similar operations provide a link between the secret intermediate data and the public final result.
A SOTA can be mounted during these operations. We can build templates on the side channel leakage of
op4, which transfers the public final result. Then, we reveal the secret intermediate data manipulated by
other operations. Considering practical recovery situations, different adversaries acquire various abilities
for recovering target secret values when utilizing SOTA, as described in the previous steps. We give
following definition of the attack abilities.
Definition 1 (Adversary’s Attack Ability). The adversary’s attack ability is evaluated by the result
set of Target when an adversary, A(SOTA, Target, Template), utilizes a SOTA to reveal Target based
on Template. The evaluation can be described by
A(SOTA, Target, Template) = RCTarget + ζ, (7)
where RCTarget is the result set of Target and ζ is noise.
The result set RCTarget indicates the possibilities of actual results, which are typically dependent
on leakage models. ζ indicates noise during the SOTA. In the definition, two factors affect the final
matching results. Without loss of generality, we take one byte as an example. The upper bound of
one byte recovery is that the adversary can uniquely confirm the target byte value without any noise,
which means |RCTarget| = 1 and ζ = 0. The lower bound is that the adversary cannot obtain any
biased information about Target, which means |RCTarget| = 256 and ζ =∝. The side channel leakage
acquirement quality, template building methods, preprocessing methods, and other elements affect the
adversary’s attack ability.
3.3 Hidden multiplier problem over GF (q)
The HMP over GF (2n) was first introduced at Asiacrypt 2014 [3], and then at CHES 2015 [4]. The
definition of HMP is as follows [4].
Definition 2 (Hidden Multiplier Problem). Let k← GF (2n). Let ` ∈ N. Given a sequence (ai,Li)16i6`,
where ai ← GF (2n) and Li = HW(ai · k) + εi, where εi ← N (0, σ), recover k.
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HW denotes the Hamming weight. ε is the leakage noise where N (0, σ) denotes the Gaussian distri-
bution with null mean and standard deviation σ. Given known ai and σ = 0, the adversary can easily
recover k, because for known ai the least significant bit of HW is a linear function of the bit of secret k.
In our attack scenario, (full or noisy) intermediate values xi can be obtained through SOTA, based on
which we extend it to a new problem as follows.
Definition 3 (Hidden Multiplier Problem over GF (q)). Let N = p× q, where p and q are two n-byte
long big primes. Let ` ∈ N. Given a sequence (Li,Ri)16i6`, where Li = LM(xi) + εi, εi ← N (0, σ),
xi ← GF (q) and Ri = HB(xi × p), recover p.
HB(∗) denotes half the most significant bytes of ∗. The leakage Li is the side channel leakage in a
leakage model LM(∗). ε is the leakage noise. In an RSA-CRT implementation, x, p, and q are the same
length big integer (typically, 64-byte long), where HB(xi × p) are identical to the counterpart of the
corresponding modular exponentiation result. The security of RSA-CRT is reduced to such a problem.
The adversary can easily obtain the hidden prime with known x. However, given biased information about
x, no method for solving the problem has thus far been published. We aim to handle it by revealing the
hidden prime p under the attack results of A(SOTA,xi, C). For convenience, we denote big integers as
n-byte vectors, xi = (xin−1, x
i
n−2, · · · , xi0), and p = (pn−1, pn−2, · · · , p0), where xij represents the j-th
byte of the i-th modular exponentiation, and xi0 is the least significant byte and x
i
n−1 the most significant
byte. ri is the corresponding result of xi×p +Cp . We represent the results with vector {ri2n−1, · · · , ri0}.
We utilize a divide-and-conquer strategy for recovering the hidden prime byte-by-byte. In view of
the byte, the detailed multiplication procedure can be represented (from the most significant byte) by
the method shown in Figure 2. hb and lb respectively denote the high and low byte of 16-bit interme-
diate data. Every rij derives from one or several intermediate bytes, which are labeled using the same
color, and the carries of the former intermediate bytes. In general, given xn−1, xn−2, · · · , xn+1−j and
pn−1, pn−2, · · · , pn+1−j , the next result byte r2n−j can be represented by the function
r2n−j = f(xn−j , xn−j−1, pn−j , c2n−j−1). (8)
c2n−j−1 represents the carries from the computation procedure of r2n−j−1. Obviously, when j ap-
proaches n, the number of intermediate bytes is a linear function of j. For 0 6 j 6 n−1 (or n 6 j 6 2n−1),
ri derives from 2× (j+ 1)− 1 (or 2× (2n− j)− 1) intermediate bytes. In this study, we evaluated how to
solve the problem defined in definition 3 byte-by-byte with the SOTA results. Two obstacles are easily
detected. The first is the linear increment of intermediate bytes, which means that the carries may be
extremely large, which would prevent us from obtaining a precise guess on pn−j . The second obstacle is
the precise calculation of the intermediate bytes, including the selection of a different high or low byte.
In next section, we provide the solution for the two obstacles.
3.4 Byte-by-byte recovery of prime
As mentioned in Section 2, a modular exponentiation result C can be represented by a simpler form
C = x × p + Cp, where x and Cp are secret. Given biased information about x byte-by-byte, we can
recover the secret and fixed prime p byte-by-byte with high probability. Our recovery procedure is shown
in Figure 3. According to adversaries’ attack ability, we can obtain the result set Itm (corresponding to
input xtm), where 1 6 m 6 w, as shown in Figure 3. If we denote by O all possible values of one single
byte, we can obtain
⋃ Im = O. A typical side channel leakage model is a Hamming weight, where w = 9
and
⋂ Im = ∅ .
If an adversary attempts to reveal the i-th prime byte, given xt = {xtn−1, xtn−2, · · · , xtj+1}, p =
{pn−1, pn−2, · · · , pj+1}, and xtj ∈ Itm, we traverse all possible values in the set Itm and prime byte
values by comparing r2n−i and then we obtain the corresponding result prime set P0. Increasing t from
0 to a certain number, we can obtain all the corresponding prime byte sets Pt. Several prime bytes exist
in each of these result sets, which can be obtained by the interaction between all Pt. These results are
filtered in the procedure, as shown in the Figure 3. However, a big problem is that the carries will be
linear increment when j approaches 0, which can hinder recovery. Our solution is to utilize two adjacent
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Algorithm 2 Byte choice algorithm of 16-bit intermediate value
Require: index i j, attack index BytePosition, 16− bit Intermediate value TempResult;
Ensure: PreviousByte, CurrentByte,NextByte = ByteChoice(TempResult);
1: if i + j == BytePosition− 2 then
2: PreviousByte⇐ TempResult & 0xFF;
3: CurrentByte⇐ 0;
4: NextByte⇐ 0;
5: else if i + j == BytePosition− 1 then
6: PreviousByte⇐ TempResult >> 8 & 0xFF;
7: CurrentByte⇐ TempResult & 0xFF;
8: NextByte⇐ 0;
9: else if i + j == BytePosition then
10: PreviousByte⇐ 0;
11: CurrentByte⇐ TempResult >> 8 & 0xFF;
12: NextByte⇐ TempResult & 0xFF;
13: else if i + j == BytePosition + 1 then
14: PreviousByte⇐ 0;
15: CurrentByte⇐ 0;
16: NextByte⇐ TempResult >> 8 & 0xFF;
17: else
18: PreviousByte⇐ 0;
19: CurrentByte⇐ 0;
20: NextByte⇐ 0;
21: end if
1 1
i i
x IÎ
Result 
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t t
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x IÎ
0 0
i i
x IÎ
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R
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R
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1 1n nx p- -´
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Figure 3 Prime byte filtered procedure. Figure 4 Details of carry reduction procedure.
bytes of input xt, xtj and x
t
j−1. During our prime byte recovery procedure, the two adjacent bytes can
help eliminate the carry problem and the carries are limited to two choices, 0 and 1.
The carry reduction procedure can be summarized by Equation 8. The details of the procedure are
shown in Figure 4. In the figure, cur represents the current prime byte for recovery and pre and nex
represent the previous and next prime bytes, respectively. On the left-hand side of the figure, detailed
byte multiplications corresponding to the first prime byte are shown. Given xn−1, xn−2 and the guess
on pn−1, all the green boxes can be viewed as known intermediate values. The unknown values are the
gray box and the low byte of the addition of all the next green boxes. The unknown intermediate byte
and the known intermediate bytes’ addition result provide two possibilities of carries, 0 or 1. A similar
situation can be found in pn−2 recovery, as shown on the right-hand side of Figure 4. Given xn−1, we
try all possible xn−2, xn−3, and pn−2, and then, the number of unknown intermediate bytes is still two
and the carries are fixed. Therefore, the recovery procedure of all the prime bytes can control the linear
increments of the carries.
As stated in the previous section, another obstacle is the precise calculation of the intermediate bytes.
Algorithm 2 provides a solution of the carry problem. An easily overlooked problem is how to confirm
all previous bytes xn−1, xn−2, · · · xj+1 when traversing xj and xj−1. Given each byte xtj ∈ RCTarget and
j → 0, the traversal time is excessive and computationally infeasible if we cannot confirm all the previous
input bytes. Therefore, we must (approximately) confirm these input bytes. Our solution is the simple
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Algorithm 3 Single prime byte recovery algorithm
Require: xt = {xtn−1, xtn−2, · · · , xti, xti−1}, where xti ∈ It0 and xti−1 ∈ It1, p = {pn−1, pn−2, · · · , pi+1},
previous prime byte set Spre where pi+1 ∈ Spre, result rt = {rt2n−1, · · · , rtn}
Ensure: Spi+1,pi
1: for t = 0 to n do
2: for all pi+1 ∈ Spre do
3: for prime = 0 to 255 do
4: Index⇐ 1 B flag
5: p = {pn−1, pn−2, · · · , pi+1, prime}
6: for all xti ∈ It0 do
7: for all xti−1 ∈ It1 do
8: xt = {xtn−1, xtn−2, · · · , xti, xti−1, xti, xti−1} B obtain previous input bytes
9: TempResult = g(x,p, C2n−i−1) B obtain TempResult
10: {PreviousByte, CurrentByte,NextByte} = ByteChoice(TempResult) B obtain intermediate value
11: if CurrentByte 6 rt2n−i − 1 && PreviousByte ≡ rt2n−i+1 && Index then
12: A[pi+1][prime]+ = 1; B compare intermediate value and rt, count all possible prime byte
13: Index⇐ 0
14: end if
15: end for
16: end for
17: end for
18: end for
19: end for
20: Spi+1,pi ⇐ max(Aprimepi+1 ) B obtain prime byte results
division of r by the previous prime byte. Half of the most significant bytes of the multiplication leaks,
which means that we can easily obtain all the bytes of x given known prime bytes. We claim that the
completely hidden p can be recovered through the recovery procedure shown in Algorithm 3.
As shown in the Algorithm 3, typically |Spre| > 1. We have to uniquely confirm the previous prime
byte, namely, |Spre| = 1. This recovery algorithm provides the solution for this confirmation after the
current prime byte recovery, as shown in line 20 of the algorithm. We emphasize that all the previous
prime bytes can be uniquely confirmed during the next byte recovery.
4 Practical experiments
4.1 Measurement setup and experiment environment
In order to evaluate the proposed attack method, we targeted 1024-bit RSA-CRT implemented on 8-
bit AVR microcontroller clocked at 10 MHz. Its architecture is serialized without any countermeasure
against SCAs. Because of the long integer and the serialized architecture, we can detect feasible outputs
of certain computations. In other words, we can benefit from this architecture. This implementation
utilizes two close primes:
p: 0xcd083568d2d46c44c40c1fa0101af2155e59c70b08423112af0c1202514bba5210765e29ff13036f56c7495
894d80cf8c3baee2839bacbb0b86f6a2965f60db1.
q: 0xca0eeea5e710e8e9811a6b846399420e3ae4a4c16647e426ddf8bbbcb11cd3f35ce2e4b6bcad07ae2c0ec2
ecbfcc601b207cdd77b5673e16382b1130bf465261.
In addition, a LeCroy 610Zi WaveRunner 8-bit oscilloscope is needed. We evaluated this scheme based
on 12,000 profiling traces and 150 attack traces and Algorithm 3 on an Intel Xeon personal computer.
4.2 SOTA in RSA-CRT software implementation
The application of SOTA to an unprotected RSA-CRT software implementation follows the steps de-
scribed in Section 3. We present a detailed description of our attack procedure. We stress that the
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of our software implementation is high [1], which allows us to obtain accurate
templates using 12,000 profiling traces and achieve a high success rate within 150 attack traces.
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(d) Leakage characteristics
Figure 5 Power traces of targeted RSA-CRT implementation.
We first scrutinize the power traces to obtain similar operation locations in the same measurement. An
exemplary power trace of both parts is shown in Figure 5(a) marked by two black squares. It is easy to
detect the two operations that share a similar appearance, as shown in Figure 5(b) and (c), by mere visual
inspection. Both parts indicate the power consumption of two similar operations. The first operation is
the data transferal of secret intermediate data, and the second is the data transferal of the public final
result C. When two operations are executed, the basic hardware behaves similarly and similar leakage
patterns can be detected, as shown in Figure 5. Although the envelopes of the two parts are similar,
slight differences can also be detected, as shown in Figure 5(c) marked by the black crosses. Noise and
different manipulated data cause a slight vibration in the power traces. A practical leakage situation
is depicted in Figure 5 (d). This figure reflects the leakage situation verified by Pearson’s correlation
between power traces and final outputs.
We evaluated the leakage model using clustering techniques. The results show that the leakage model
is a Hamming weight, which is consistent with our knowledge of the leakage characteristics of an AVR
processor. In Figure 6, (a) and (b) are the templates and the secret intermediate data leakage model,
respectively. Both obey the Hamming weight leakage model. However, the two leakages are slightly
different, which makes the matching error high. We utilized a zero-mean method [28] to unify the two
different leakage characteristics. In both Figure 6(c) and (d), a similar leakage after zero-means is shown.
The results show that zero-mean is a feasible preprocessing method for cross-device TA and SOTA.
Despite the visual similarity of the leakage patterns, we must confirm the leakage uniformity of two
similar operations in our measurement. Perceived information (PI) [11] is a convenient statistics tool
for this purpose. Researchers utilize PI to evaluate the leakage of a cryptographic implementation. PI
reflects the bias between the model and the target leakage, which is defined by
PI(S;L) = H[S]−
∑
x∈S
Pr[s]
∑
l∈L
Pˆ rchip[l
t|s]log2 Pˆ rmodel[s|lt]. (9)
Pˆ rmodel[s|lt] = N (ltx,d|µs∗ ,Σs∗) (described in Section 2) corresponds to the 256 maximum likelihood
estimates of conditional density functions Prchip[L|x]. In our case, PI is computed by
PI(S;L) = H[S]−
∑
x∈S
Pr[s]
∑
l∈L
Pˆ rchip[l
t1
si |s]log2 Pˆ rmodel[s|lt2pi]. (10)
Our leakage model is built on lt2pi. Then, PI can be used as a tool for testing the similarity between the
template and the actual leakage lt1si . The PI results are shown in Figure 7. As can be seen, PI increases
with the profiling traces, which means that the leakages of similar operations are similar. Then, we can
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Figure 6 Raw power traces before and after preprocessing.
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Figure 7 Perceived information vs. profiling traces. Figure 8 Matching success rate vs. various traces.
conclude that SOTA is reasonable. We utilize SOTA to obtain the Hamming weight of x through the
templates built on the final results.
We show the success rate results in Figure 8, based on Equation 5 described in Section 2. Given a
specific number of power traces acquired under the same intermediate data, the success rate is obtained
by dividing the total attempts by the occurrences of correct matching. As shown in Figure 8, the success
rate reaches 90% with 10 power traces and 100% with approximately 100 power traces in our experimental
environment.
4.3 Secret prime recovery
We show the first two prime byte recovery results based on Algorithm 3 in Figure 9. In Figure 9(a), the
results show the occurrences of all the possibilities, where the highest peak is located at 0xCD. However,
we did not uniquely confirm the first byte value, but two elements, 0xCD and 0xCE, remain in the result
set. We utilize the two values to reveal the second prime byte; the results are shown in Figure 9(b). The
peak on the left-hand side of the figure uniquely confirms the first prime byte. As shown in Figure 9, we
can obtain our expected results even on 20 inputs x.
We traversed all pn−1 and pn−2 under 100 inputs x. The results are shown in Figure 10. A similar
situation, that the highest peak occurs under the correct pn−1, can be seen in the figure. All the incorrect
guess results are apparently lower than the correct one. The curve peak also indicates the result set of
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(b) Second prime byte recovery results
Figure 9 Two most significant prime bytes recovery results.
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Figure 10 First two prime byte recovery results. Figure 11 Results of 2nd-8th prime byte recovery.
pn−2. We can conclude that, given sufficient computational power, adversaries can execute recovery word
by word. We present the recovery results from 2ndC8th prime bytes in Figure 11. Each byte recovery
result is distinct. In addition, we present the remaining prime byte recovery results in Figure 12. In both
figures, we just select two possibilities of the previous prime byte, where the correct one is arranged on
the left-hand side of these figures.
Adversaries’ attack abilities vary. In a practical attack scenario, we believe ζ 6= 0, which occurs when
poor denoise methods are used, limits the template side channel leakage or limits the matching traces
in a TA procedure. Error in matching is a natural result under noise conditions. Here, we consider the
situation where the adversary obtains incorrect matching with a certain probability, which means that xi
are randomly categorized into adjacent Hamming weights. The differences between these adjacent and
actual values are 1 or 2. We evaluated the situations where 10%, 20%, 30%, and 50% of inputs obtain
incorrect matching. The first two prime byte results are shown in Figure 13. The first prime byte recovery
is shown in Figure 13(a). The result set is still distinct at 50% noisy traces, when the difference is 1.
The adversary can still find the correct prime byte involved in the highest peak with a Hamming weight
matching difference of 2 and 30% noisy traces, but the highest one is not the correct result. We need to
enlarge the set Spre in the next byte recovery. We cannot obtain sufficient information about the first
prime byte when the noisy traces reach 50% and meanwhile the Hamming weight matching difference is
2. However, in similar situations, the second byte recovery result peak can also be detected, as shown in
Figure 13(b). The correct prime byte is involved in the highest peak even in the worst case, where 50%
of inputs are noisy and the difference is 2.
4.4 Computation complexity estimation
In this section, we present a computation complexity analysis of Algorithm 3. Considering the practical
side channel leakage scenario, as described in Section 4, we present the analysis based on Hamming weight
leakage. The four iterations (lines 1, 3, 6, and 7) of the algorithm are the primary computational load.
The expectation of elements in traversing a set is
∑8
h=0 prh × |Hamh| ≈ 50, where prh and |Hamh|
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(b) 17-24 prime byte recovery results
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(c) 25-32 prime byte recovery results
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(d) 33-40 prime byte recovery results
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(f) 49-56 prime byte recovery results
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Figure 12 During these recovery experiments, the results show the two options of the previous prime bytes. All the
left-hand sides of all the figures show the correct previous prime bytes.
0 128 2550
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
All Prime Byte
O
cc
ur
en
ce
 
 
no noisy traces
10% noisy traces and Hamming Weight difference is 1
20% noisy traces and Hamming Weight difference is 1
30% noisy traces and Hamming Weight difference is 1
50% noisy traces and Hamming Weight difference is 1
10% noisy traces and Hamming Weight difference is 2
20% noisy traces and Hamming Weight difference is 2
30% noisy traces and Hamming Weight difference is 2
50% noisy traces and Hamming Weight difference is 2
192 208
40
60
80
100
 
 
correct prime byte 0xCD
(a) First prime byte results with noisy inputs
0 128 255 128 25520
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
All Prime Byte
O
cc
ur
en
ce
 
 
no noisy traces
10% noisy traces and Hamming Weight difference is 1
20% noisy traces and Hamming Weight difference is 1
30% noisy traces and Hamming Weight difference is 1
50% noisy traces and Hamming Weight difference is 1
10% noisy traces and Hamming Weight difference is 2
20% noisy traces and Hamming Weight difference is 2
30% noisy traces and Hamming Weight difference is 2
50% noisy traces and Hamming Weight difference is 216
40
60
80
100
 
 
correct prime byte 0x08
(b) Second prime byte results with noisy inputs
Figure 13 First and second prime byte recovery results with different noisy inputs. When recovering the second prime
byte, we give two options of the first prime byte. The left part shows the correct one.
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are the probability and the element number of Hamming weight h, respectively. Lines 6 and 7 require
approximately 212 loops in total. The prime byte requires approximately 28 loops (line 3). The trace
iteration (line 1) requires approximately 28 loops. Considering line 2, each prime byte recovery needs
to traverse 230 elements on average. Therefore, the time complexity is O(2n), where n ≈ 30. In our
experiments, we utilized 100 inputs for single prime byte recovery, where n < 30 is satisfied. The average
time of the single byte recovery is about 30 sec on the computer used in our experiment.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we introduced the similar operation template attack (SOTA) as a new variant of the TA to
evaluate the security of PKC schemes. A heuristic algorithm was proposed to solve the HMP over GF (q)
in the secret prime recovery for an RSA-CRT implementation. The proposed SOTA does not require an
additional profiling device. The template is constructed based on public values and then used to reveal
secret intermediate values. It is noteworthy that our method can be combined with a lattice attack (e.g.,
Coppersmith’s method) to obtain a wider applicability in security analysis for PKC implementations.
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